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ARTICLES
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW AS A CAREER*
Anthony D'Amato**
Law students are likely at some point in their education to become
fascinated with the idea of pursuing a career in public international
law. What species of law could possibly be more important? they might
ask. International law deals with the truly significant questions facing
the world: war and peace, human rights, freedom of travel and emigra-
tion, terrorism and interventionism, international ecology and environ-
mental preservation, and interesting new problems such as ocean min-
ing and outer space exploration and exploitation. By comparison, the
daily concerns of domestic lawyers, such as whether corporation A
must pay corporation B a sum of money, do not seem vested with ep-
ochal significance. Yet immediately, the student encounters a funda-
mental paradox: although international law seems to be the most im-
portant species of law in content and significance, it is clearly the least
important in terms of career opportunities. Law firms do not appear to
care about the prospective applicant who wants to work in public inter-
national law or who has taken law school courses and seminars in that
field.
In brief, there exists an egregious case of market undervaluation.
The most important field is the one least financially rewarded. This
undervaluation also extends to law schools, which are creatures of the
financial marketplace to a far greater extent than their apologists
would concede. Although courses in international law do have some
standing in law schools, perhaps more than their marketability would
suggest, law faculties generally look upon them as "soft law" and con-
sign them to a distinctly secondary place in the curriculum. The law
school, as Duncan Kennedy and others have pointed out, is really a
microcosm of the world of the large law firm, and students are trained
to become cogs in the financially successful institutions of corporate
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America.'
Law firms exist and persist by skimming profits off the transactional
costs of interactions among corporations, citizens, and the government.2
Some lawyers increase the friction of those transactions so as to gener-
ate more work for themselves. A law school graduate may eventually
become disillusioned with the pressure to increase friction by couching
contracts, codes, statutes, regulations, warranties, and pleadings in
complex legal jargon that ensures the hiring of more lawyers to read
and interpret those works.3
I would like to address the question of why there is such a huge
undervaluation of public international law in legal education and prac-
tice. I will also try to examine some implications of this inquiry for law
students. Finally, I shall make some personal remarks, not because my
own situation is an example of anything in particular, but because I
acknowledge that it is necessary for the observer to recognize his own
position in the field he describes. I could hardly expect the reader to
accept my observations about a field unless I am willing to turn these
observations inward and examine my own reasons and biases for choos-
ing an economically irrational career in public international law.
Professor David Kennedy has described the duality of international
legal studies at Harvard Law School. On the one hand, "the interna-
tional law library occupied pride of architectural place in a law school
that offered an extremely wide variety of seminars on the law of far
flung places."" But on the other hand, he perceived that international
law was:
not in the mainstream of my legal education ... [the course offerings] were all
upper level courses and yet did not seem to be related to first year domestic
offerings in any hierarchical or progressive way. Although international law
1. See Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in THE
POLITICS OF LAW 40 (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
2. See R. NADER & M. GREEN, VERDICTS ON LAWYERS, i, vii, xv (1976) (Nadcr's
introductory overview); M. Green The Gross Legal Product: "How Much Justice Can
You Afford?" in R. NADER & M. GREEN, VERDICTS ON LAWYERS 65-77; see also J.
AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA
40 (1976) (noting the historical development of the American corporate legal elite);
Swaine, Impact of Big Business on the Profession, 35 A.B.A. J. 89, 169 (1949) (refut-
ing various allegations of excessive business control over attorneys). See generally, P.
HOFFMAN, LIONS OF THE EIGHTiES (1982) (offering the inside story of the "powerhouse
law firms"); M. GREEN, THE OTHER GOVERNMENT (1975) (describing large corporate
Washington law firms as a form of other government).
3. See Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE POLITICS OF
LAW 21 (D. Kairys ed. 1982) (documenting the complexity of the common law that
allowed lawyers to claim expertise beyond ordinary reason in early American society).
4. David Kennedy, International Legal Education, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 361, 366
(1985).
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seemed to make some claim to be concerned with fundamental jurisprudential
questions or jurisdictional priority, many of the courses presented international
law as the specialized continuation of some domestic subject such as taxation or
investment . . . few if any of my professors "specialized" in international, com-
parative or historical legal studies.
I can add from anecdotal experience that faculty members who micro-
scopically examine Article 9 of the UCC or spend their lives research-
ing advance sheets of cases brought under Rule 10-b5, tend to look at
international law as parasitical on "real" law. They view international
law as a hopeless attempt by quasi-lawyers (who are really political
scientists) to claim that, somehow, international political decisions fol-
low legal standards instead of those of national self-interest. It is not
law, they say, because there are few international courts, fewer interna-
tional decisions, and those decisions are not enforceable.
The more generous of these professors might say that if there is such
a thing as international law, students are best trained for it by learning
to "think like a lawyer" in all the conventional courses. Then, when
those students must someday grapple with a public international law
problem, they will be well equipped to handle it using the usual tools of
legal analysis. A leading private practitioner of public international law
reacted the same way when I asked him whether he would be inter-
ested in interviewing the best students in my international law classes.
He responded that he was only interested in my best students period,
and not those who had taken international law. "They'll get all the
international law training they need from us," he explained; "just send
me the top students and we'll teach them the rest."
All of these attitudes and arguments can be refuted decisively. Yet
who will listen? What non-international law professors will read these
remarks? What busy practitioner will care? Nevertheless, for the rec-
ord, here are some brief refutations:
(1) That international law is "really law" is a topic I have addressed
at length elsewhere." Suffice it here to say that any legal system, do-
mestic or international, defines the set of entitlements of its subjects
and provides for enforcement of those entitlements by depriving the
transgressor of one or more of them. The domestic legal system accom-
plishes this enforcement in familiar ways (courts, judgments, the sher-
iff), whereas the international system does it by less visible, but equally
effective, entitlement deprivations that are carefully regulated by pre-
5. Id. at 366.
6. See D'Amato, Is International Law Really "Law'?, 79 Nw. U.L. REv. 1293
(1985).
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scriptive norms. No observer can understand international relations
without knowing how these norms define proper national interests and
provide for their enforcement.
(2) When law professors say that international law is not really
needed as a subject because all that is necessary is the ability to "think
like a lawyer," the best answer is to ask them to pick any subject other
than torts, contracts, or criminal law, and justify its independent status.
Are not sales, tax, agency, bankruptcy, trusts and estates, and constitu-
tional law simply variants of contract law? Can not family law, anti-
trust, regulated industries, administrative law, and just about any other
course you can name be considered as simply admixtures of torts and
contracts? What justifies all those courses? 7 Proponents of those
courses will insist that there is something "extra" about their subject
matter that cannot be deduced from the principles of torts and con-
tracts, and which requires a specialized understanding of other kinds of
intellectual issues. We reply that the same is true of international law.
Not only are there special problems when nations, as well as individu-
als, are the creators and subjects of the same law, but international law
also borrows from an amalgam of foreign legal systems those special
procedures and arguments that have fused to make international law a
distinct specialty. Finally, if not most importantly, there are jurispru-
dential issues, such as figuring out what customary international law
consists of and how it is proved, that have no close analogues in domes-
tic law. In terms of intellectual challenge, public international law
should take a back seat to no other legal discipline.
(3) Practicing international lawyers who claim that junior associates
need no law school training in international law so long as they have
good minds, may unknowingly be wearing blinders. Their law firms
may have missed decisive international law issues in their litigation and
negotiations simply because no lawyer on the staff realized that those
issues were present in the factual situations. Attorneys may engage in
international law practice without recognizing potentially crucial argu-
ments in their favor. Regardless of whether they win or lose those
cases, they may never know what they have missed (unless the other
side comes up with those "missing" arguments). I have read many de-
cisions in which I could spot hidden and potentially decisive interna-
tional law issues that neither side argued and the judge certainly failed
7. Cf. Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in THE
PoLincs oF LAw 47 (D. Kairys ed. 1982) (challenging the dichotomy between those
subjects considered "hard" and those considered "peripheral" in the law school
curriculum).
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to notice. Hence, the international lawyers who hire young law students
with the attitude that they will learn whatever public international law
they will need to know in the course of working for the firm, may be
begging the question by adopting this in-bred attitude.
Yet, as I have said, these "refutations" conjure up the image of hit-
ting one's head against the wall. It may take years before rational ar-
gument makes a dent in the minds of comfortable law professors and
more than comfortable practicing attorneys. International law today
may be to law what eighteenth century biology was to science, and it
may take a paradigm shift before international law is given its proper
status in the law school curriculum and in law firm placement.
II.
Unfortunately, if the market undervalues international law, it may
remain undervalued for a long time. Law students cannot be blamed
for turning their intellectual energies to the problem of getting corpora-
tion A to pay a sum of money to corporation B, because that sum of
money includes the attorneys' livelihood. What advice can be given to a
law student who wants to spend a lot of time thinking about and study-
ing international law?
One possibility is to go to work for corporation A. The student, how-
ever, must make sure that corporation A is a multinational corporation
with a great deal of business outside the United States. The fact that
foreign business is involved does not guarantee that in-house counsel in
the international legal affairs division of corporation A will practice
public international law, but there remains that possibility. Dealings
with foreign governments, foreign legal systems, choice-of-law
problems, and questions of sovereign immunity, certainly can arise
when one's client is a multinational corporation. Additionally, the at-
torney will be dealing with foreign attorneys and foreign bar associa-
tions. A variety of individual issues facing employees of the corporation
will also arise including: the validity of marriages abroad, adoptions,
immigration and emigration, passports, visas, false arrests and deten-
tions, and civil liberties in foreign countries. Finally, corporation A
might have operations in areas that directly come under international
law: the oceans of the world (fishing, seabed mining, conservation, navi-
gation), international rivers, harbors and straits, the polar regions, or
even outer space technology.
I have advised many of my students to look for work in the legal
departments of corporations that have an international business, and
from time to time I hear from some of them that they enjoy a tremen-
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dous degree of responsibility for far-flung international business and
legal matters. They say that public international law plays an impor-
tant part in their professional lives. So there can be some public inter-
national law "success stories" in the legal department of the right
corporation.
A second possibility is to work in the office of the Legal Adviser to
the Department of State. These lawyers for the most part practice pure
public international law. The work is obviously exciting and challeng-
ing, but the jobs are few and there is huge competition for limited
positions.
Other branches of government have specialty divisions in their legal
departments for international law, such as the Departments of Justice
and Commerce. In addition, the entire Foreign Service field welcomes
legally trained applicants for career positions.
The third possibility, joining a law firm, is unlikely to result in an
international law practice except in special or "lucky" cases. Yet there
are many international lawyers in law firms in New York and Wash-
ington D.C., and increasingly more in other major cities.
Fourth, many students interested in international law find that their
first jobs do not include any work in that field. This is perhaps the most
critical point of decision for young people interested in international
law. Most people just tend to forget international law and become ab-
sorbed in the law practice they are in. It is difficult to keep in touch
with a field when you are absorbed in entirely different matters. Some-
times, however, the best opportunities open up several years after you
are doing nothing but domestic law.
Sometimes lightning will strike, as happened to a young lawyer
working for a large law firm when, because of his knowledge of Spanish
and his prior studies in international law, he was assigned to work on
the project of a Latin American country. A year or two later, due to
the volume of the work and the country's insistence, he left the firm
and opened up his own practice devoted almost entirely to legal work
for that country. He now has a highly successful small firm serving one
satisfied client. Indeed, his example suggests a model for other coun-
tries - to have individual legal representation in the United States.
Young attorneys, however, should not wait for lightning to strike.
The best thing for an attorney not practicing international law to do is
to write an article or two on an international law subject. The best
subjects are those that might interest your clients. For example, I sug-
gested to a former student who is working for a large oil company that
she write an article on deep-sea oil drilling. She is not involved with her
company's international law division, but she could write an article
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that, a few years from now, might enable her to obtain an important
position in that division. In general, I would suggest to young lawyers
that they contact their former professors of international law from time
to time and ask for ideas about topics of current interest. Writing an
essay in a legal periodical is the best way for a young attorney to rise
above the crowd, and perhaps to lay the groundwork for a later career
in international law.
Finally, a broad category of career opportunity is to teach public
international law in a law school. There are over one hundred and fifty
law schools that have, or could be talked into having, a faculty member
who specializes in public international law. By research and writing,
teachers of public international law can build an international reputa-
tion which can lead to employment as an attorney on important inter-
national law cases. So long as this practical work coincides with the
professor's research and teaching interests and does not interfere with
class preparation, experience as counsel in this kind of case may en-
hance and enrich the professor's knowledge of the field. All seriously
interested students should consult two excellent books of career oppor-
tunities in international law published by the American Bar Associa-
tion and the John Bassett Moore Society of International Law.,
Nevertheless, adding up all these opportunities realistically does not
produce an encouraging sum. It is very difficult to practice interna-
tional law and make a living at the same time. You have to be con-
vinced that sometimes the most important things in the world simply
do not have much of a market value, and you must be prepared to
make a financial sacrifice in order to do them. (Your friend's affection
for you may be the single most valuable thing in your life, but does it
have any market value? People who are demonstrating against the MX
missile may - and I hope only "may" - be engaged in the single
most important activity in the brief history of sentient life on the planet
Earth, but they hardly are paid for their efforts. More likely, they are
rounded up and thrown into jail.') If making money makes life worth
living, you should probably go into any field at all except public inter-
national law. On the other hand, if dedicating your life to the ideals of
world peace and human rights gives your existence meaning, don't ex-
8. See generally CAREER PREPARATION AND OPPORTUNITIES IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW (J. Williams 2d ed. 1984); J.B. MOORE SocIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW DIREC-
TORY OF OPPORTUNITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (7th ed. 1984).
9. See United States v. Allen, 760 F.2d 447, 449, 453-54 (2d Cir. 1985) (upholding
the convictions of MX Missile protestors after rejecting defendants' international
claims); United States v. Montgomery, 772 F.2d 733, 737-38 (11 th Cir. 1985) (involv-
ing protesters convicted for protesting the MX Missile and nuclear activities).
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pect others to pay you much. For if others placed much value on world
peace and human rights, then we would have already attained those
ideals and there would be no need for your services now. Instead, peo-
ple place value on building up nuclear arsenals of planetary destruction
and on in-groups exploiting out-groups. This global insanity is called
the market system, so if you want to combat it, don't expect that very
same system to reward you.
III.
Let me now make some personal observations about my career as a
teacher and practitioner of public international law. The first dilemma
I had to face was to reevaluate my relationship to the government. Put-
ting it this way may strike the reader as grandiose, yet I believe study-
ing international law is extremely liberating in terms of philosophical
perspective. I was conscious of wanting to work in a discipline where
the actors were nation-states, one of which was my own country. What
should I think of the policies and preferences of the United States? As
a citizen, could I possibly be an impartial observer? How could I write
or advocate anything in international law if I could not genuinely treat
all nations equally?
I wondered what it would be like for people who wanted to work in
international law if they lived under dictatorships. No doubt they could
not progress very far unless they served as justifiers and apologists for
their governments. They would either have to absorb and internalize
the values of their countries, or else be committed to a life of hypocrisy,
but in either event they would have an all-powerful "client" whose poli-
cies they could not second-guess and whose actions they would have to
justify by their legal arguments.
Fortunately for me, the United States is a free society. No one told
me how I had to come out in my writings. When in the late 1960's my
non-classroom time was spent entirely in research, writing, and active
litigation contesting the legality of the Vietnam War, I was not muz-
zled or financially penalized in any way. I must add, however, that
most of my colleagues were distinctly unsympathetic and that I was
looked upon as a "nut." A few years later, when it became politically
and academically respectable to oppose the Vietnam War, those social
and collegial pressures abated.
My attitude toward the Vietnam War was itself a minority view.
People were roughly divided into two main camps: the overwhelming
majority (including academics) who supported the war for geopolitical
reasons, and the minority (including draftees) who believed that the
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war was a geopolitical mistake and not in the best interest of the
United States. I was in a very small third camp, opposed to the war for
reasons of international human rights. It was quite clear long before
"hard" evidence surfaced that the United States engaged in war crimes
atrocities in Vietnam that were not sporadic violations but endemic to
our uncomfortable military situation there. Thrust into a guerrilla war,
we responded the same way as did the United States troops in the Phil-
ippines in 1900.10 Of the many incidents I could recount, let me just
give one. By 1969, American aircraft had engaged in thirty-nine dis-
tinct bombing attacks on the internationally renowned leper sanatorium
in Quyuh Lap, North Vietnam. The roofs of the buildings in the sana-
torium were painted with the Red Cross."' Nevertheless, this humani-
tarian, non-military target was a favorite among United States pilots,
many of whom now captain your friendly domestic airplanes. In an
interview at the time, one of the pilots explained the "psychology" of
this kind of bombing mission:
When you hit school buildings, or hospitals, or especially dams, you have a feel-
ing of accomplishment. You see the effects below in terms of scattering adults
and children, or water bursting and knocking down houses, or buildings caving
in. a2
Instead, to drop bombs in the leafy jungle would mean that there
would be no visual results. Yet the bombs had to be dropped some-
where, because the pilots were sent out with full loads of bombs and
told to come back after dropping them.
I thought long and hard whether I could blame the United States for
these violations of human rights and I decided that I could not. In the
first place, it seemed to me that other countries in the same position
might do the same thing. (Many years later, this thought was con-
10. See W. POMEROY, AMERICAN NEo-COLONIALISM: ITS EIERGENCE IN THE
PHILIPPINES AND ASIA 88-92 (1970). In the so-called "Fil-American War" of 1898-
1900, the United States conquered the Philippines in part to maintain commercial mar-
kets. Id. at 13-35, 190-200. American troops committed widespread atrocities against
Filipinos, particularly after the Americans faced increasing guerilla resistance. Id. at
86, 88-96. As in Vietnam, the destruction of homes and even entire villages was com-
mon, and various methods of torture were used on peasants and soldiers alike. Id. at
89-95. Some U.S. troops were court-martialed for their abuses in this war. Id. at 91-92,
94; see also R. BARNET, INTERVENTION AND REVOLUTION: THE UNITED STATES IN
Ta THIRD WORLD 99-100 (1968) (analogizing the American support of terrorism in
the post-World War II Greek government to the American support of the Diem gov-
ernment in Vietnam).
11. See D'Amato, Gould & Woods, War Crimes and Vietnam: The "Nuremberg
Defense" and the Military Service Resister, 57 CAL- L. REV. 1055, 1086 (1969). re-
printed in 3 THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 407, 438 (R. Falk d.
1972).
12. N. CHOMSKY, AMERICAN POWER AND THE NEW MANDARINS 14 (1969).
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firmed by the Soviet atrocities in Afghanistan, 3 their own "Vietnam.")
Secondly, the policy of the United States was subject to change. By
bringing the atrocities to light, instituting lawsuits,' 4 and making it
clear to military commanders that they were personally at risk for com-
manding or condoning war crimes, there was a chance, in a free soci-
ety, to make a difference. Thus I found myself in an interesting logical
trap: I could not blame the United States without blaming myself be-
cause I was a citizen of the United States. The only way I could avert
self-blame was to campaign actively against the policy I deplored. So
long as I did engage in such a campaign, I could not blame the United
States as a whole for its policy! In brief, as a member of the state, the
battle I had was not with the state itself but with other members of the
state.
This perspective, which may seem simplistic now, was liberating for
me at that time. I could fight the United States government's policies
in Vietnam in the name of the United States! The government, after
all, did not represent the United States any more than I did; though
the government might have effective power, it was as subject to the
Constitution as I was. Incidentally, a small but sweet moment for me
was when the United States paid me as a public defender for a case
where the court reversed the convictions of persons who had disrupted
a draft board office, and held unconstitutional a part of the Military
Selective Service Act.1" Receiving that check provided a real lift to my
spirits because the United States actually paid me for defeating the
government in a case that the government went to great lengths to
win. 16
13. See SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS & HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, 99TH CONG., IST SESS., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS FOR 1984
1159-69 (Joint Comm. Print 1985) (State Department Report chronicling abuses of
human rights and atrocities committed in Afghanistan by the Soviet-backed regime).
14. See J.N. MOORE, LAW AND THE INDO-CHINA WAR 570-98 (1972) (Chapter
XIII, The Justiciability of Challenges to the Use of Military Force Abroad, citing
cases, and discussing the basis of challenging American actions in the Vietnam War).
15. United States v. Baranski, 484 F.2d 556, 570-71 (7th Cir. 1973) (reversing
convictions of draft resisters and holding part of the Military Selective Service Act
unconstitutional).
16. Id. at 556. In the Baranski case, the defendants had poured blood on a number
of files in the draft board office. The court sequestered these files for evidence in the
case, and the potential draftees whose files were sequestered were never drafted. The
government decided not to appeal the case to the United States Supreme Court even
though the Seventh Circuit held part of the Military Selective Service Act unconstitu-
tional. The Seventh Circuit's decision also contradicted the Fourth Circuit precedent in
another case involving the pouring of blood on Selective Service files. See United States
v. Eberhardt, 417 F.2d 1009, (4th Cir. 1969) (affirming convictions under the same
provision held unconstitutional in Baranski), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 909 (1970).
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Out of the specific experiences I had regarding the Vietnam War,17 I
believe I developed an internationalist perspective. There are no "good
nations" or "bad nations," but there are nations which from time to
time violate the basic human rights of all peoples. One's moral perspec-
tive should be grounded, I believe, in these universal human rights. If
one's own state violates these rights, one has a moral duty, I assert, to
try to oppose effectively those policies. Effectiveness, I hasten to add, is
not the same as joining in mass demonstrations or writing letters to
Congress, though for some people such outlets may be all that are
available. For people who have the training and opportunity to fight on
a more effective basis, I believe that their moral obligation is commen-
surately greater.
In addition to the anti-Vietnam activities, I was fortunate to be in-
volved as assistant counsel to Liberia and Ethiopia against South Af-
rica in the World Court cases of the mid-1960s, 8 and in various indi-
vidual human-rights cases throughout my teaching career.10 Not all
professors of international law get these opportunities and I am grate-
ful that a good number of them have come my way. To some extent
these cases involved clashes with my own university and colleagues, but
I must admit that the freedom of a professor of law to take unpopular
positions, while not as great as that of a sole practitioner or a member
of a very small law firm, is certainly not as restricted as that of a law-
yer in a large law firm. Lawyers in large firms are tremendously shack-
led by the decisions of their partners concerning what is good for busi-
ness and what would reflect adversely upon existing clients. Yet, even
their freedom to take an unpopular human rights case is favorable
compared to those attorneys who work as in-house counsel for corpora-
tions (who may rarely if ever get leave to work on such cases) or coun-
sel for the Departments of State or Justice or other branches of the
government (who would be totally barred from handling any private
human rights cases).
As much as I would like to see good students become professors of
17. See generally A. D'AIATO & R. O'NEIL, THE JUDICIARY AND VIETNAM
(1972) (recounting some personal experiences involving the Vietnam war).
18. South West Africa (Ethiopia v. S. Afr.; Liberia v. S. Afr.), 1966 I.CJ. 6
(Judgment of July 18, 1966) (narrowly rejecting challenges to South African adminis-
tration of South West Africa (Namibia)); see G-M. COCKRAM, SOUTH WEST AFRICA
MANDATE 317-43 (1976) (discussing the case before the International Court of Jus-
tice); S. SLONIM, SOUTH WEST AFRICA AND THE UNITED NATIONS 278-309 (1973)
(placing the ICJ 1966 judgment in the context of international efforts to solve the
Namibian problem). See generally THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA/NAMIIBIA DistUT. (J.
DUGARD ed. 1973).
19. See A. D'Amato, Litigating International Law (to be published in 1986)
(describing various human rights cases).
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international law, I would not want to paint an idyllic picture of the
academic scene. There are petty satraps in the academic field as in any
other, and small-minded people who are clever at in-fighting and office
politics manage to puff themselves up into large dimensions on law
school faculties.
When I read about Einstein or other great scientists whose work I
admire, I find in their lives a great sympathy toward their students and
a large-minded willingness to have their theories revised or improved
by the next generation. In my own field, however, I have found instead
a fear of new ideas and especially a fear of having one's pet theories be
upset by one's own students. In part, I attribute this difference to a
medieval sense of "priesthood" that still seems to permeate interna-
tional law, though it has long since dissipated in physics, chemistry or
biology. The elderly priests of international law have their legitimacy at
stake; what they've pronounced as the truth depends on the validity of
the theoretical arguments they have used to support their pronounce-
ments. If someone challenges the validity and consistency of that intel-
lectual scaffolding, their words of wisdom might tumble down. Hence
some of them may view students as heretics rather than as fellow truth-
seekers.
If international law, by means of good scholarly standards, can in-
crease in precision and objectivity, and if its underlying theory can be
made clearer and more intellectually satisfying, much of the "priest-
hood" attitude will necessarily fade away. The discipline will become
stronger as it becomes more logically rigorous. In my view, prospects
for the field of international law are extremely optimistic. If students
approach the field realistically, I think they will be pleasantly
surprised.
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